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Real world contracts limit the liabilities of agents by imposing constraints on their 
transfers or on their utilities.  In an adverse selection model, Sappington (1983) has 
shown that the two constraints yield an equivalent problem for the principal.  We show 
that this result does not hold in a moral hazard framework. More specifically, we show 
that restrictions on the utilities are stronger in the sense that they yield a lower level of 
effort from the agent.  Moreover, given an optimal contract constrained by a limited 
liability on utility, one can always find a Pareto dominating contract constrained by a 
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Introduction 
In situation of moral hazard, the results of a manager’s actions are subject to 
uncertainty.  One way to limit the potential consequences of this uncertainty is to buy 
insurance.  Another way is simply to limit the extent of liability that economic agents are 
forced – or willing – to accept.  Most countries have bankruptcy laws that allow people or 
corporations to limit their financial liability.  Limited liability clauses are often included 
in private contracts.  Bankers who extend loans to corporations or individuals have their 
liability limited to the amount of their investment.  Firms accepting risky procurement 
contracts are often protected from excessive losses and are therefore guaranteed a certain 
level of profit. 
The pervasiveness of limits to liability is particularly justified in situations of 
moral hazard.  The fact that efforts, even exerted in good faith, can have random effects 
could deter many people from entering into contracts and probably be detrimental to 
economic activity. 
Despite the multitude of sources and forms of limited liability, economists have 
classified them into two major categories.  Those that guarantee a certain level of profit 
(or utility) and those that guarantee a certain level of transfers (or penalty).  Bankruptcy 
laws place an upper limit to an agent’s losses therefore guaranteeing him a certain level 
of (perhaps negative) profit.  On the other hand, when buying a stock in a corporation, an 
investor’s risk is limited to the amount invested (i.e., its transfer to the firm).  Minimum 
wage laws also guarantee a certain level of transfer from an employer to the employee. 
A limited liability constraint on transfers can in general be interpreted as resulting 
from limited financial resources; while the constraint on utility corresponds to a   2 
minimum level of well-being (Sappington 1983).  The constraint on utility can also 
approximate a situation of extreme risk aversion beyond a certain level of losses. For 
instance, Stole (1994) argues that "it is plausible that a firms' behavior may be risk 
neutral over a moderate range, but risk averse for dramatic losses." 
  Despite these very intuitive differences in limiting liability, not much attention 
has been paid to the consequences of imposing one form of limited liability rather than 
the other.  A reason might be that the two constraints are equivalent in most models.  
Indeed, as the now classical paper by Sappington (1983) shows, imposing a restriction on 
transfer payments to the agent is exactly equivalent to imposing a restriction on his utility 
in an adverse selection model. 
  In this paper, we show that this equivalence is not true in a moral hazard 
framework.  Sappington’s result relies on the one-to-one relationship between the agent’s 
decision variable (e.g. effort) on the one hand and the commonly observed output and the 
contingent transfers on the other hand.  In a moral hazard framework, there is no longer a 
one-to-one relationship between the agent’s effort and his transfer.  When the agent 
chooses a particular level of effort, his output and therefore his transfer are uncertain.  
Guaranteeing him a level of utility is no longer equivalent to guaranteeing a level of 
transfer. 
 
  We also develop a simple model of imperfect output observability which shows 
the same properties as the moral hazard model and confirms that the key element in 
breaking the equivalence between the two forms of limited liability constraints is the 
absence of a one-to-one relationship between effort and transfer.   3 
  A question naturally arises: which constraint should be used to limit the liability 
of the agent?  Is a constraint “better” than the other?  We show that a constraint on 
transfer Pareto dominates a constraint on the utility.  In other words, given an optimal 
contract with a limited liability constraint on utility, it is possible to derive an optimal 
contract with the same constraint on transfer that makes both the principal and the agent 
better off. 
  In section 1, we will briefly present the intuition behind Sappington’s result of 
equivalence of the ways of imposing limited liability in an adverse selection framework.  
In section 2 we will show that this equivalence does not hold in a moral hazard model.  In 
section 3, we will compare the optimal contracts under the two constraints.  In section, 
we present a model of imperfect output observability.Finally, the consequences of our 
finding will be briefly discussed as concluding remarks.   4 
1.  Limited Liability in an adverse selection model 
 
  Sappington (1983) considers a standard adverse selection model and studies the 
effect on the optimal contract of two different limited liability constraints: one which is 
imposed upon the transfers and the other on the utility.  Sappington proves that both 
formulations lead to the same optimal contract. 
  To provide some intuition for that result, consider the following adverse selection 
model.  Suppose a principal hires an agent to perform a task and offers him a contract to 
regulate their relationship.  The agent’s effort (e Î Â+) together with a productivity 
parameter (q Î Â) determines the output X=a(q, e).  The function a(q,e) satisfies the 
conditions a'e>0, a'q>0, a''ee£0, a''eq³0, a(q,0)=q. 
1  The productivity parameter is of 
known density (q Î [q-, q+]) but its realization is private information of the agent.  Effort 
is costly for the agent, and this cost is represented by j(e).  The function j(e) satisfies the 
conditions  j'e>0,  j''ee>0,  j(0)=0 , lime®0 j'e=0, lime®¥ j'e=¥.
2  Assume that the 
principal freely and perfectly observes X, while he cannot observe either q or e.  The 
transfer from the principal to the agent is represented by t(X) (with t(X) Î Ñ).  The utility 
of the agent is assumed to be separable in income and utility and can then be represented 
by U=t-j(e). The principal’s objective is to maximize his expected profit P=E[a(q,e)-t]. 
Assume also that the agent knows his type (q) when signing the contract. 
                                                 
1 a'e denotes the first partial derivative with respect to the first argument, aq denotes the 
first partial derivative with respect to the second argument, a''ee denotes the second 
partial derivative and a''eq denotes the cross-partial derivative. 
2 j'e denotes the first derivative and j''ee denotes the second derivative of j(e).   5 
  Suppose that a limited liability constraint is imposed on the contract.  Following 
Sappington (1983), we use two formulations.  In formulation LLt, the limited liability 
constraint requires the transfers to be above some level L, 
(LLt)    tX L X () , ³"     
while formulation LLu requires that the utility level of the agent be above the same level, 
(LLu)       Ut X e L X =-³ " () ( ) , j     
regardless of the level of output required from the agent.  In formulation LLu, we 
interpret limited liability as an ex ante constraint on contracts.  The fact that the agent’s 
level of utility and effort are unobserved does not limit the enforceability of this 
constraint: all it does is forbid the principal and the agent from entering into contracts 
which could potentially result in losses for the truthful agent.   
Sappington established that, in an adverse selection model, both formulations 
(with the same L) will lead to exactly identical optimal contracts.
3  The intuition for that 
result goes as follows.  If the relevant constraint to the contract is (LLt), the agent can 
always guarantee himself a level of utility L by exerting no effort.  In that case 
UtL =³ .  Similarly, if the contract requires (LLu), it must always give a transfer t such 
that  tL X ³" ,    , otherwise, the agent will never exert any effort.  Clearly the 
maximization of the principal’s objective function under the constraint of (LLt) or (LLu) 
is equivalent, since both constraints imply each other. 
 
 
   6 
2. Limited Liability in a moral hazard model 
 
We now consider the impact of the two forms of limited liability on the optimal 
contract in a moral hazard problem, using a simple model similar to the one presented in 
Kreps (1990).  Assume that the principal hires an agent to perform a task and offers him a 
contract to regulate their relationship.  The agent actions can always result in two 
outcomes: success or failure.  In case of success, the principal collects an output XS; while 
in case of failure he will only collect XF, XS>XF. 
By exerting effort, the agent can increase the probability that his actions will 
result in success. We note r(e) the probability of success, where e is the effort exerted by 
the agent. In addition, we assume that r(0)=0; r'e³0; r''ee£0 and lim ( )
e re
®¥ £1.
4  The agent 
is assumed to be risk neutral and to have a utility function represented by Ut e =- j () ,  
where t is the transfer received from the principal and j(e) represents the cost of effort, 
defined in section 1. 
The problem for the principal is to solve the following program: 




e Î arg max r(e) tS + [1-r(e)] tF - j(e)     (IC) 
 
r(e) tS + [1-r(e)] tF - j(e) ³ 0        (IR) 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
3 See Sappington (1983), Appendix A for a formal proof. 
4 r'e denotes the first derivative with respect to effort and r''ee denotes the second 
derivative.   7 
where tS and tF are the transfers paid, respectively, in case of success or failure. 
(IC) is the incentive constraint which insures that the agent maximizes his utility; and 
(IR) is the rationality constraint which guarantees a positive value to the contract for the 
agent. Since our problem is concave, we can implement the first order approach. (IC) 
then becomes: 
  r'e tS - r'e tF = j'e       (IC) 
 
 
2.1 Optimal contract without Limited Liability 
The optimal contract for this simple problem when no limited liability is imposed is well 
known and simple since our agent is risk neutral. In this model, the optimal level of effort 
to be exerted by the agent is given by: 
r'e (XS-XF) = j'e       (1) 
This is the first best level of effort. It is also immediate to show that in this setting,  
  t S -tF = XS-XF        ( 2 )  
which implies that the agent becomes the residual claimant and supports all the risk 
associated with failure, a result known in the literature as "selling the firm to the agent." 
 
2.2 A Constraint on transfers 
Assume that the limited liability constraint the principal faces is of the (LLt) type, 
i.e., a minimum level on transfers.  The problem for the principal becomes: 
  M a x   r(e) XS + [1-r(e)] XF – r(e) tS – [1-r(e)] tF 
 
subject to 
   8 
r(e) tS + [1-r(e)] tF - j(e) ³ 0          (IR) 
 
  r'e tS + r'e tF = j'           (IC) 
 
tL L S ³³ ,  tF      ( L L t ) 
where (LLt) is the relevant form of the limited liability constraint, which guarantees that 
all transfers will be above the required minimum.
5  We assume that L is large enough so 
that LLt is binding.  We will solve the problem assuming that (IR) is not binding.  It can 
be verified ex-post that this assumption is justified.  Since IC implies that tt SF ³
6 , the 
relevant limited liability constraint is tL F ³ .  Solving the optimization problem gives the 
solution: 






























j     (3) 
 
Call  et the optimal level of effort defined by (3). 
 
2.3 A Constraint on Utility 
Now assume that, instead of taking the form of a constraint on transfers, the 
limited liability takes the form of a constraint on the utility of the agent (LLu).  The 
problem remains identical to the one described in the preceding section, except that now 
                                                 
5 For example, Innes (1990), Banerjee and Besley (1990), Schmidt (1997) and Kim 
(1997) examine moral hazard models with this type of limited liability constraint. 
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.   9 
the relevant limited liability constraint will be te L F -³ j () .
7   Solving the optimization 
problem leads to the solution: 





























' 2 ) (     (4) 
 
Call  eu the optimal level of effort defined by (4). 
 
3. Comparisons of the Two Results 
The inspection of the two results clearly shows that the two constraints do not 
lead to the same optimal level of effort: the optimal effort under LLu (eu) will always be 
lower than under LLt (et). 
 
PROPOSITION 1: The optimal level of effort is always lower under LLu than under LLt. 
PROOF: Immediate, comparing (3) and (4). 
 
In moral hazard problems, where the relationship between effort and output is 
random and limited liability is imposed through a minimum payment, the effort level 
required from the agent is set at a suboptimal level (relative to first best). This level is 
however higher than the one that would be required had the limited liability constraint 
been introduced by imposing a minimum level of utility. 
                                                 
7 For example, Brander and Spencer (1989), Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castillo (1997, p. 
65), and Stole (1994) examine moral hazard models with this type of limited liability 
constraint.   10 
  The intuition behind the result is simple: when limited liability is imposed through 
a minimum payment, the principal can increase effort simply by raising tS.  Increasing tS 
alone will preserve both the LLt constraint and the IC.  To increase effort, the principal 
will have to pay the high transfer in r% of the cases. 
  On the other hand, when limited liability is imposed as a minimum level of utility, 
the principal has to increase both tS and tF to elicit effort from the agent.  Indeed, the LLu 
constraint shows that an increase in effort has to lead to an increase in t F, in order to 
protect the agent from losses resulting from failure despite having exerted the optimal 
effort.  This increase will in turn lead to an increase in tS in order to meet the incentive 
requirements.  By contrast to the previous case, the principal always has to increase 
transfers (100% of the cases) to elicit a higher effort. 
It is interesting to contrast our result with Sappington’s result.  The main reason 
why Sappington’s intuition does not carry in a moral hazard model is that the concept of 
agent’s utility is different whether it is measured before the output is realized (expected 
utility) or after (effective utility).  When the principal guarantees tS³L and tF³L, he also 
ensures that the agent will receive an expected utility greater than L.  The agent can 
always choose to exert no effort (which induces failure) and therefore receive at least L.  
However, if the agent exerts an effort, he cannot be sure that his effective utility will be 
above L.  Indeed, the contract could specify that an output corresponding to a failure 
should be paid no more than L.  However, a failure could be due to “bad luck.”  An agent 
who has effectively exerted a positive effort would receive a utility level below L. 
   11 
  In figure 1, we illustrate the optimal level of effort in a case where r(e)=e/(1+e) 
and j(e)=e2/2.  The graph shows that the limit on utility constraint appears to be a much 
more stringent requirement leading to a much lower optimal effort.    12 
Figure 1a: Optimal Effort Under Two Forms of Limited Liability 
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We can characterize further the two resulting contracts.  First note is that it is 
always possible to identify two distinct levels of liability, Lt and Lu, such that the relevant 
agency problems give rise to the same level of expected utility for the agent when Lt is 
the relevant liability level under constraint LLt and Lu is the relevant liability level under 
constraint LLu.  See lemmas 1 and 2 in appendix. 
We can now formulate an interesting result emerging from the optimal contract: 
for a given level of expected utility of the agent, the principal will always receive a 
higher expected profit by offering the agent a liability limit on transfers (LLt) rather than 
one on the utility (LLu).  
The following lemma is useful in demonstrating this result. 
 
LEMMA 3: Given E(Ut) = E(Uu), E(Pt) > E(Pu) if  
 [r(et)-r(eu)](XS -X F) > j(et)-j(eu)      ( 5 )  
PROOF: See appendix. 
 
Therefore, as long as condition (5) holds, a contract offering a limited liability of 
the type LLt will yield higher profits for the principal for any given level of expected 
utility for the agent than a contract offering a limited liability of the type LLu and 
generating the same level of expected utility for the agent. 
   14 
PROPOSITION 2:  Optimal contracts with limited liability on transfers Pareto 
dominate optimal contracts with limited liability on utility. 
PROOF: See appendix. 
 
This result follows from proposition I.  As LLu generates a larger distortion in 
effort, it forces the optimal contract farther away from the first best level than LLt.  The 
resulting additional loss in output for the principal is not compensated by the reduction in 
effort cost for the agent.  This is sufficient to guarantee that inequality (5) is respected. 
Therefore, given lemma 3, there is an incentive compatible contract under LLt which 
Pareto dominates the best incentive compatible contract under LLu.  
The intuition behind proposition 2 is illustrated in figure 2.  On the graph, et and 
eu represent the optimal level of effort given LLt and LLu respectively. 








et  eu   15 
Condition (5) requires that the segment (A-B) be larger than the segment (C-D).  
The first order conditions (equation (3)) requires that eA and eB must be in the area where 
the slope of the expected production [r(et)(XS-XF)] is greater than the slope of the effort 
function [je(et)].  Then, it is clear that (5) is true. 
Proposition 2 has important consequences for the design of optimal contracts 
under limited liability.  Suppose a government wishes to protect a defense contractor 
from bankruptcy.  This could lead the government to offer a contract constrained by a 
limited liability on profit (utility)(see Stole (1994) for example).  For any such contract, 
Proposition 2 tells us that there exists an alternative contract derived with limited liability 
on transfers that guarantees both the principal and the contractor a higher level of utility. 
The reason why our result differs from Sappington’s result is that, in a moral 
hazard model, when the agent chooses a level of effort, he does not know which transfer 
he will receive because the output is uncertain.  In a standard adverse selection, the 
agent’s choice variable (whether it is the effort or another variable) has a one-to-one 
relationship with the output observed by the principal. 
Therefore, our result would also apply to an adverse selection model as long as 
the one-to-one relationship does not exist.  An example would be a standard adverse 
selection model with a random shock on the output.  The model becomes a hybrid mix of 
adverse selection and moral hazard as in Picard (1987).  Another example would be a 
standard adverse selection model with imperfect output observability (Lawarrée-Van 
Audenrode (1996)).  Such models are, however, complex and relatively uncommon in the 
literature.  To focus on our point while keeping the analysis simple, we present below a   16 
model of imperfect output observability where the adverse selection parameter has been 
removed.  We show that our propositions 1 and 2 apply. 
 
4. Limited Liability when Output is Imperfectly Observed 
 
Consider a model where, in equilibrium, as in our moral hazard case, the agent has only 
two levels of effort.  He can either work hard (e=e*) or he can shirk (e=0).  Imperfect 
output observability means that, when he works hard, the agent could be accused of 
shirking. Precisely, we assume that the agent working hard will be recognized as such 
with probability r (r>1/2) and will be said to have shirked with probability (1-r).  
Symmetrically, an agent shirking will be detected with probability r.  The problem for the 
principal will be to induce the agent to work hard while meeting its limited liability 
constraint.  The difference between this model and the previous one is that here the 
principal’s objective function embodies the true output and not the one observed by the 
principal. 
If the limited liability constraint he is faced with is of the (LLt) type, i.e. a 
minimum level on transfers, the problem for the principal is the following: 
   t r tr e ~ ) 1 ( ) (   max - - - a        
subject to: 
rt r t e t r r t +- - ³ -- () ~() ~ () 11 j       ( I C )    
rt r t e +- - ³ () ~() 10 j       ( I R )    
tL t L ³³ , ~              ( L L t )  
   17 
where  ~ t is the transfer paid to the agent found shirking and t is the transfer paid 
otherwise.  Since, in this model too, tt ³ ~ , the relevant limited liability constraint is 
~ tL ³ .  Solving the optimization problem gives the solution: 




=         
When a limited liability constraint takes the form of a constraint on the utility of 
the agent (LLu), the relevant limited liability constraint will be ~ () te L -³ j .  Solving the 
optimization problem leads to the solution: 








=      
The inspection of the two results clearly shows that the two constraints do not 
lead to the same optimal level of effort.  Our proposition 1 still applies.  The proof is 
provided in the appendix. 
The proof that proposition 2 also applies is similar to the one provided for the 
moral ahazard model and is available from the authors.  This exercise shows that the 
crucial element that differentiate Sappington’s result from our result is the presence or 
not of a one-to-one relationship between effort and output.  
   18 
Conclusions: 
 
We have shown that under moral hazard and other frameworks where there is not 
a one-to-one relationship between effort and output, modeling a limited liability 
constraint as a lower limit on transfers is not equivalent to modeling it as a lower limit on 
utility.  Moreover, contracts with limits on transfers Pareto dominate contracts with limits 
on utility.  This has important implications on the design of optimal contracts.  Limited 
liability restrictions guaranteeing a certain level of utility to the agent are often imposed 
upon the parties – like the case of bankruptcy laws for example.  We have shown these 
contracts to be inefficient for instance when moral hazard is present. 
Note that this raises the question why the limited liability constraint was imposed 
in the first place.  In the introduction we mentioned Sappington’s explanation: to 
guarantee a minimum level of well-being.  An alternative explanation is the extreme level 
of risk aversion.  For instance, if the defense contactor goes bankrupt, national security 
would be jeopardized.  In such a case, the relevant limited liability constraint is always a 
constraint on the utility. 
While many legal restrictions can easily be classified as constraint on utility or 
transfer, others are more difficult to categorize.  Minimum wage laws, for instance, are 
perfect examples of a lower limit on transfers to be paid to an agent in execution of a 
work contract.  Yet, by many aspects, the U.S. minimum wage law also guarantees a 
certain level of utility to some workers.  This is achieved by imposing minimums to 
piece-rate wages and commissions, by regulating pay for overtime work as well as 
working conditions, and by prohibiting the employer from imposing obligations on their   19 
employees (for example forcing them to buy uniforms) which would bring their 
compensation below the minimum required (Murphy, 1987).   20 
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Appendix A: moral hazard model 
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Therefore the principal’s expected profit will be identical under LLt and LLu if 
(A2)=(A3), i.e., if 
) (
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PROOF OF LEMMA 3: 








u u F F S u e
e
t
t F F S t r
e r
e L X X X e r
r
e r
L X X X e r j j j ¢
¢
- - - + - > ¢
¢
- - + -
) (
) ( ) )( (
) (
) )( ( (A4) 
Imposing the constraint E(Ut) = E(Uu), i.e., substituting (A1) into (A4) and rearranging 
terms yields [r(et)-r(eu)](XS -X F)> j(et)-j(eu). 
 
 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2: 
Using a second-order Taylor expansion around et, we get: 
2
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It is straightforward to verify that (A7) is true given (i) 
t te e r¢ ¢ < 0 and 
t te e j ¢ ¢ > 0, (ii) (eu-et) < 
0 by Proposition 1 and (iii) 
t e r¢ > 
t e j¢  from inspection of (3). 
Notice that, given Lemma 2, the following “dual” relationship could also be derived: 
given E(Pt) = E(Pu), E(Ut) > E(Uu). 
 
Appendix B: imperfect output observability model 
 
 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1: (by contradiction):   
Assume eB > eA.  Since jee> 0 and aee< 0, this implies 
je(eB) > je(eA)            ( A 1 )  
and  
ae( eB) < a( eA)          ( A 2 )  
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and this contradicts (A2). 
           Q E D .  
 